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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Justin Thomas Youngman appeals from his conviction for trafficking in heroin. He
challenges the denial of his motion to suppress.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
An officer stopped a vehicle driven by Youngman for multiple traffic violations.
(R., p. 15.) Youngman’s driving privileges were suspended. (Id.) Youngman’s speech
was rapid, his motions were jerky, and his eyes were glassy, slightly bloodshot, and dilated.
(Id.) Suspecting Youngman was under the influence of drugs, the officer performed an
initial field sobriety test, the Romberg test, which Youngman failed. (Id.) The officer
observed eyelid flutters and needle marks in Youngman’s arm “consistent with recent
hypodermic needle use.” (Id.) Youngman completed the gaze nystagmus test, but refused
further field sobriety testing. (Id.) In the officer’s experience and training it appeared
Youngman was both an addict and under the influence of a central nerve system stimulant.
(Id.) A search incident to arrest revealed heroin in Youngman’s pocket. (Id.) A dog alert
on the car resulted in a search that revealed heroin and methamphetamine. (Id.) Youngman
refused a blood test. (Id.)
The state charged Youngman with trafficking in heroin, possession of
methamphetamine, and DUI; with a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp. 80-82, 19092.) He moved to suppress evidence. (R., pp. 94-103.) Relevant to this appeal, Youngman
claimed he was unlawfully arrested for DUI because officers “lacked probable cause to
believe that Mr. Youngman’s ability to drive was impaired by drugs or alcohol.” (R., pp.
102-03.)
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The district court denied the motion. (R., pp. 140-73.) The district court found that
the totality of the circumstances justifying Youngman’s arrest for DUI included “speeding,
then driving well below the speed limit, following too closely behind the vehicle in front
of him, crossing over the fog line, failure to maintain lane, taking 36 seconds to pull over,
extremely rapid speech, failure to follow instructions on Romberg test (didn’t say ‘stop’),
failed Romberg test, two negative clues out of six on HGN, dilated pupils, glassy and
bloodshot eyes, and needle marks on his arm,” and also Youngman’s refusal to participate
in further field sobriety testing. (R., pp. 170-72.) Based on this totality, the district court
found probable cause justified the arrest, and the search incident thereto was proper. (R.,
pp. 169-72.)
Youngman pled guilty to trafficking in heroin pursuant to a plea agreement
whereby the state dismissed the other counts and the enhancement. (R., pp. 201-03, 20508.) The agreement preserved Youngman’s right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress. (R., p. 201.) The district court entered judgment and Youngman appealed. (R.,
pp. 213-18.)
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ISSUE
Youngman states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Youngman’s motion to suppress
when Sergeant Klitch arrested him without probable cause?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Youngman failed to show the district court erred when it found Youngman’s
arrest was justified by probable cause to believe he was driving under the influence of a
drug?
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ARGUMENT
Youngman Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Probable Cause
Determination
A.

Introduction
The district court’s factual findings regarding the totality of the circumstances

justifying Youngman’s arrest for DUI included his driving pattern (“speeding, then driving
well below the speed limit, following too closely behind the vehicle in front of him,
crossing over the fog line, failure to maintain lane, [and] taking 36 seconds to pull over”),
the officer’s observations of Youngman indicating he was under the influence of a drug
(“extremely rapid speech, … dilated pupils, glassy and bloodshot eyes, and needle marks
on his arm”), Youngman’s performance on two field sobriety tests (“failure to follow
instructions on Romberg test (didn’t say ‘stop’), failed Romberg test, two negative clues
out of six on HGN”), and Youngman’s refusal to participate in further field sobriety testing.
(R., pp. 170-72.) These factual findings show probable cause to arrest Youngman for DUI.
Youngman argues the district court erred because the totality of the circumstances
found by the district court “would not lead a reasonably prudent officer to believe that Mr.
Youngman was driving under the influence.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.) Because the
totality of the circumstances shows probable cause to arrest, Youngman has failed to show
error by the district court.
B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence, we will

defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we exercise

4

free review over the application of constitutional standards to those facts.” State v.
Finnicum, 147 Idaho 137, ___, 139, 206 P.3d 501, 503 (Ct. App. 2009).
C.

The Totality Of The Circumstances Provided Probable Cause To Believe
Youngman Was Driving Under The Influence Of A Central Nervous System
Stimulant
“Pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception, law enforcement officers may

search an arrestee incident to a lawful custodial arrest.” State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 649,
402 P.3d 1095, 1102 (2017).

A warrantless arrest is lawful “‘where there

is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.’” Id.
(quoting Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004)).
“Probable cause for an arrest exists where an officer possesses information that
would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and
strong presumption that a person they have placed under arrest is guilty of a crime.” State
v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 779, 275 P.3d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 2012). See also State
v. Middleton, 114 Idaho 377, 380-81, 757 P.2d 240, 243-44 (Ct. App. 1988) (probable
cause for DUI arrest exists when under the “facts, taken together, a reasonable person could
form a well-founded belief that [the suspect] was under the influence … and that he had
been driving a motor vehicle”). “The officer is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from
the facts in his possession, and may base those inferences upon his training and experience
as a law enforcement officer.” State v. Webb, 118 Idaho 99, 101, 794 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Ct.
App. 1990).
The analysis in Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512, 515, 65 P.3d 534, 537 (Ct. App.
2003), is instructive. In that case the officer initiated a traffic stop when he “observed
Thompson driving ten miles per hour in excess of the twenty-five-mile-per-hour speed
5

limit.” Id. Thompson drove another quarter of a mile before stopping. Id. The stop
occurred on “a very late hour on a weekend night.” Id. The officer “detected a strong odor
of alcohol on Thompson’s breath, [and] observed that he had bloodshot eyes and dilated
pupils.” Id. “Thompson had refused to take field sobriety tests which could have
confirmed or dispelled the suspicion of intoxication.” Id. Amongst the evidence militating
against probable cause, “Thompson did not have slurred speech nor difficulty walking.”
Id. “Collectively, these circumstances are sufficient to support a reasonable belief that
Thompson had been driving under the influence of alcohol.” Id.
If anything, the facts in this case more strongly support the finding of probable
cause. In Thompson the driving pattern consisted only of speeding. In this case Youngman
was speeding, driving under the speed limit, following too closely, crossing the fog line,
and failing to maintain his lane. In Thompson the driver did not pull over for a quarter
mile (about 43 seconds at his stated speed of 35 miles per hour), in this case Youngman
did not pull over for 36 seconds and passed an off ramp before pulling over on the shoulder
of the freeway. (See Defendant’s Exhibit A2.) In Thompson the driver smelled strongly
of alcohol and had bloodshot eyes and dilated pupils, but did not have slurred speech or
difficulty walking.

In this case Youngman had extremely rapid speech, glassy and

bloodshot eyes, dilated pupils, fluttering eyelids, and needle marks on his arm. Thompson
“refused to take field sobriety tests which could have confirmed or dispelled the suspicion
of intoxication.” Id. Youngman took two field sobriety tests, one he failed outright by not
following instructions and badly misestimating the passage of time and the other he scored
two out of six indicators (not enough to itself say he failed, but not a clear pass, either),
before he refused additional tests. As in Thompson, “these circumstances are sufficient to
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support a reasonable belief that [Youngman] had been driving under the influence.” Id.
Because the district court properly concluded Youngman’s arrest was supported by
probable cause, it properly denied the motion to suppress the heroin found in his pocket
and other evidence gleaned from that arrest.
In arguing to the contrary, Youngman contends two of the district court’s findings
of fact are clearly erroneous, namely that the officer had evidence he was speeding
(Appellant’s brief, p. 11, n. 9) and that he both crossed the fog line and failed to maintain
his lane (which he claims was the same act) (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11, n. 8). Youngman
is partially correct, in that the officer testified that he saw Youngman merge onto a freeway
without signaling, follow another vehicle too closely, fail to maintain his lane, drive both
on and over the “white, right fog line,” and, when the officer drove up alongside
Youngman’s vehicle, Youngman “varied speeds, dropp[ing] well below the speed limit,”
but did not testify Youngman exceeded the speed limit.1 (6/1/20 Tr., p. 14, L. 17 – p. 16,
L. 13.) Youngman’s argument fails to show that his driving pattern, in conjunction with
the rest of the circumstances, does not support the finding of probable cause. To the
contrary, Youngman’s driving strongly supports a reasonable belief he was driving under
the influence.
Youngman next points out that the officer’s “certification as a drug recognition
expert had lapsed in 2015, so he was not certified at the time of his encounter with Mr.
Youngman.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-12.) However, the district court found this

1

The district court listed the driving pattern supporting its finding of reasonable suspicion
to investigate potential DUI as “1) fail to signal left as it merged into Interstate 90, 2) drive
over the white solid fog line failing to maintain lane, and 3) follow another vehicle too
closely.” (R., p. 147.) Substituting this uncontested driving pattern would lead to the same
conclusion that the totality of the circumstances show probable cause to arrest for DUI.
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argument unpersuasive. It found that the officer “was a certified drug recognition expert
from 2008 until 2015, when he was assigned as a detective, and let his certification lapse.
Because he is no longer certified does not mean he forgets all he learned in his training and
experience as a DRE for eight years.” (R., p. 170.)
Youngman finally attacks the “weight” that should be given individual
circumstances within the totality. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-15.) However, it is not the
role of this Court on appeal to re-weigh the evidence. See State v. McLellan, 154 Idaho
77, 78, 294 P.3d 203, 204 (Ct. App. 2013); State v. Munhall, 118 Idaho 602, 606, 798 P.2d
61, 65 (Ct. App. 1990). Youngman’s argument lacks legal merit.
Youngman’s argument also lacks factual merit. He contends the Romberg test is
not entitled to weight because it is not a “standardized” field sobriety test (Appellant’s
brief, p. 12), whatever that means. The officer testified that he was trained as a drug
recognition expert to administer the modified Romberg test as one of thirteen steps in a
standard DRE evaluation to identify what “drug categories” the suspect may be under the
influence of. (6/1/20 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 10-14; p. 50, Ls. 5-15.) He explained that the test
measures whether a suspect is showing the time perception distorting effects of a stimulant.
(6/1/20 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 10-23.) The results of Youngman’s modified Romberg test, in which
he estimated thirty seconds had passed in only 16 seconds, in conjunction with other
observations and his “experience and training,” led the officer to suspect Youngman was
under the influence of a central nervous system stimulant. (6/1/20 Tr., p. 22, L. 23 – p. 23,
L. 9; p. 23, L. 24 – p. 24, L. 8.) Youngman has failed to show the Romberg testing was
not entitled to weight.
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Youngman also points out that he scored two points on the horizontal gaze
nystagmus test, while four is required to show that a suspect is under the influence.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13.) Of course the district court was also well aware of this.
Moreover, the district court was also aware of the evidence that “a lot of impairing
substances don’t cause nystagmus,” and so the test is primarily used to detect central
nervous system depressants, such as alcohol. (6/1/20 Tr., p. 27, L. 19 – p. 28, L. 4.) Again,
Youngman has failed to show error in the district court’s consideration of this factor in the
totality of the circumstances.
Youngman next argues that because the officer did not measure his pupils, as a drug
recognition expert would have done as part of the formal evaluation, the officer’s
observations that he had dilated pupils should be given little weight. (Appellant’s brief, p.
13.) At the hearing the officer testified Youngman had “dilated pupils.” (6/1/20 Tr., p. 18,
Ls. 24-25; p. 45, Ls. 19-24.) He testified that this was something he recognized as a sign
of being under the influence of drugs from his experience and training. (6/1/20 Tr., p. 19,
L. 24 – p. 21, L. 19; p. 43, Ls. 8-16.) Youngman has failed to show evidence of his dilated
pupils was not given exactly the weight it deserved.
Youngman next argues that the officer was unsure what connection his observation
of glassy and bloodshot eyes had to use of a central nervous system stimulant. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 13-14.) This is accurate. (6/1/20 Tr., p. 46, L. 17 – p. 47, L. 4.) It was also
undoubtedly known to the district court. Again, Youngman has failed to show on the
record that the district court erred in the amount of weight given this factor.

9

Finally, Youngman acknowledges that his refusal to perform further field sobriety
testing is evidence of his consciousness of guilt. (Appellant’s brief, p. 14.) This evidence
also supports the district court’s ruling.
The district court applied the correct legal standards, considered the totality of the
circumstances including Youngman’s driving pattern, his physical characteristics and
mannerisms, his performance on two field sobriety tests, and his refusal to participate in
additional sobriety testing, and correctly concluded Youngman’s DUI arrest was supported
by probable cause. Youngman has failed to show error.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction.
DATED this 12th day of May, 2021.
/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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JACOB L. WESTERFIELD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us
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/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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